ABSTRACT System of systems (SoS) architecting is a process to bring systems together as a network structure for specific goals with unique capabilities and the cumulative capabilities achieved from their interoperability. How the capability is delivered across the network is crucial for capability-based planning mission. To meet diverse capability needs by architecting different types of systems into a network, we formulate and analyze an SoS architecting problem with network theory as a multi-objective optimization model. More specifically, we construct a three-step capability delivery model from a local and globe perspective to describe the positive and negative consequences caused by system interactions. A three-level response model with a feasibility concept is proposed as the conversion of the capability value to meet different scale combat needs and balance the deployment of new and old weapons. And then, certain intelligent optimization algorithms incorporated with the proposed model is designed to approximate Pareto fronts of three response levels, respectively. Results from a set of numerical studies demonstrate that an efficient structure with fewer nodes performs better than a full set structure, and the deployment of a system should be a comprehensive consideration of its overall structural influence rather than single system performance. In addition, four SoSlevel attributes are also defined and calculated as supplements to make the value of solution architecture more comprehensive.
I. INTRODUCTION
Capability-based planning (CBP) has become a crucial mission for many countries around the globe including the American, British, Canadian, and Australian Defense Forces in future force design which can operate effectively in a diverse range of future scenarios from a system of systems (SoS) perspective. An SoS is the collection of individual and independent systems that are brought together for specific goals. Each system contributes to the SoS with unique capabilities and the cumulative capabilities achieved from their interoperability. SoS architecting administers appropriate integration of the systems as the fundamental of CBP. The Defence Capability Development Handbook (DCDH) 2014 [1] of Australia defines capability as the capacity or ability to achieve an operational effect. An operational effect may be defined or described regarding the nature of the effect and of how, when, where, and for how long it is produced.
In order to provide expected capabilities for various scenarios, portfolio selection which involves choosing a set of interoperable systems for programming is treated as a key process in CBP. Although the project portfolio selection problem has seen increasing interest over the last decade especially in finance and economic fields, the research on this problem in the CBP context is still scant [2] . Several challenges which include high risk and cost, highly uncertain environments, long-term planning, hard budget constraints, and the complex interdependences of the military projects make it different from the standard industry portfolio problem. Among those challenges, the most difficult part lies in the analysis of the impact of the correlation between projects. As information technologies continue to evolve, the concept of networkcentric warfare which integrates sensors, decision-makers, and weapon systems together to achieve better synchronize effects was proposed as an increasingly popular research area to conduct strategic approaches in early stages of military designing and planning [3] . ''Many studies have been undertaken to give vision on the features of this new concept warfare and how the centralized, linear, non-networked systems were motivated to a decentralized, nonlinear and networked design paradigm to support better architecture decision making'' [4] . The particularity of the national defense project requires the portfolios to be selected in terms of multiple conflicting objectives which includes maximization of capabilities, minimization of strategic risks and cost, and balance of investments. This also results in a multi-objective optimization problem to optimize the force structure across a number of future scenarios. Although several objectives need to be considered when conducting CBP, the primary concern is how to prioritize capabilities by evaluating them on different measures of effectiveness, utility, and performance. However, the traditional way of scoring the capabilities by Capability Managers (CMs) is insufficient, and the research on the capability generation mechanism (CGM) is rather scant. The abstract capability is an indirect manifestation of the value of the force structure. The fundamental issue is how to design a well-performing weapon architecture consisting of existing weapons and planning weapons from the perspective of the SoS in the context of network-centric warfare. Cumulative capabilities consist of existing capabilities enhanced and additional capabilities emerged, resulting from their interoperability will be the main paradigm for capability evaluation. In addition, some attributes of the SoS that are equally important to capabilities should also be considered a supplement in CBP. Therefore, this paper focuses on the capability generation model research and the use of multiobjective optimization methods to solve the portfolio selection and future force structure design problem in the CBP from the SoS perspective.
In the literature of the field mentioned above, many approaches have been established in recent years from different perspectives. Han and DeLaurentis [5] provide an SoS modeling method with a network theory-based approach and use heuristics to generate a network design for SoS models. Similarly, Davendralingam and DeLaurentis [6] focus on a robust network design optimization problem by viewing the SoS as a network structure. Wolf [7] notes the use of multi-objective optimization concept in SoS development. Rovekamp and DeLaurentis [8] employ multi-objective optimization to solve SoS design problems for space exploration architecture. Konur et al. [9] formulate and analyze an SoS architecting problem representing a military mission planning problem with inflexible and flexible systems as a multi-objective mixed-integer-linear optimization model. The approaches related to military portfolio selection are also presented in Agarwal et al. [10] , Curry and Dagli [11] , Konur and Dagli [12] , and Konur et al. [13] . Agarwal et al. [10] discuss the selection of systems to form an SoS architecture by considering the SoS capability and system intercommunications. Multiple SoS attributes including robustness, performance, net-centricity, affordability, and modularity are considered objectives to assess the overall quality of SoS with a fuzzy assessor method. Genetic and particle swarm optimization methods are proposed for the resulting multi-objective portfolio selection. Yang [14] analyzed the dynamic portfolio optimization problem with a genetic algorithm (GA) based technique under economic uncertainties. Buede and Bresnick [15] did some research on early military investment portfolio selection. In order to maximize the value of the projects to meet future demands, Parnell et al. [16] extended the multiobjective analysis using Pareto methods and optimization models. Monte Carlo risk analysis and its related methods [17] were first considered measures of the value of military investment portfolio selection. Gutjahr et al. [18] combined the portfolio selection and resource allocation as a bilevel modeling and optimization approach to an R&D project selection problem. Buckshaw [19] proposed a methodology based on expert reviews from different disciplines and a costbenefit analysis method for weapons and equipment systems. Recently, Kangaspunta et al. [20] determined the value of the system portfolio through simulation of countermeasures to estimate interdependencies. Apparently, in maximizing the combined value of multi-objective problems, researchers have made significant efforts with many existing methods. Muller [3] explores coevolution in a counter-trafficking SoS and develops an approach to demonstrate its impacts. The approach implements a trade study using swing weights to explain the influence of coevolution on stakeholder value. Dou [21] proposes a novel portfolio value model for military acquisition from two main perspectives: a five-level set of Technology Pushing Measures (TPMs) and a two-level set of Requirement Pulling Measures (RPMs). However, he did not consider the impact of the operational usage of weapons on the final value. Cheng [22] proposed a capability value model according to the OODA operation loop theory to conduct weapon system portfolio selection. Wan [23] analyzed the resource allocation problem in weapon SoS architecting by using operation loop theory and realistic rules as the basis for portfolio evaluation. Pape et al. [24] proposed a fuzzy evaluation method for SoS portfolios and evaluated the capability of the evolving SoS architecture concerning four attributes: performance, affordability, flexibility, and robustness. Davendralingam and DeLaurentis [25] give an analytic portfolio approach considering five most intuitive nodal interactions which include capability, requirements, relay, bandwidth, and compatibility. Shafi et al. [2] present an optimizing simulation approach to combine an evolutionary multi-objective optimization algorithm with a reinforcement learning technique to generate capability programs which optimize strategic risks and program costs across multiple planning scenarios as well as over a rolling planning horizon. However, he just focused on the portfolio of capabilities without considering the force design problem.
The work presented in this paper is explicitly motivated by the military SoS architecting problem in the CBP context. In most work to date, decision makers seek to model the portfolio alternatives as a system collection and try to optimize the force structure with multiple objectives from an SoS perspective considering the interrelations of projects [10] - [13] , [21] - [24] . However, there are still some aspects that are lacking in consideration and research. First, most military portfolio researches [17] - [21] are based on a collection of systems with some internal association rules which is still mostly a set theory based problem. However, the real SoS is primarily a network rather than a set. Second, research on how an SoS delivers the capability is rather scant. Although Agarwal et al. [10] , Curry and Dagli [11] , Konur and Dagli [12] , Konur et al. [13] , Cheng et al. [22] , Wan et al. [23] , and Pape et al. [24] have modeled the SoS as a network, they just use some network metrics as performance measures but pay no attention to how the network collaboration influence the capability. Third, considering the actual operational applications, the configuration and deployment of weapons should use feasibility as a selection criterion rather than achieving greater capabilities [2] , [3] , [21] , [24] , [25] . Domerçant and Mavris [26] proposed a collaborative network evaluation tool (ARCNET) to provide an estimation of the impact on mission effectiveness resulting from changes in collaboration between military units. The consideration of structural collaboration and complexity' influence pattern inspire our study.
Based on the problems proposed, the main innovative contribution of this study is as follows. A network-based capability value generation and weapon portfolio selection approach is proposed with a capability delivery model and a multi-objective optimization method. In our approach, systems were chosen as a subgraph instead of a subset from the network perspective relative to traditional methods [17] - [21] . Although Agarwal et al. [10] , Curry and Dagli [11] , Konur and Dagli [12] , Konur et al. [13] , Cheng et al. [22] , Wan et al. [23] , and Pape et al. [24] have modeled the system of systems as a network, they are not applied for portfolio optimization problems. A value delivery model considering three generation patterns is established to address the concerns of understanding how the interactions among systems affect SoS capability. A three-level response model with a feasibility concept is defined in this paper as the optimization objective instead of simple capabilities to adapt to the operational needs, and the final structure is considered to be a fusion of three levels of optimization results. In addition, several SoS-level attributes are defined and calculated as a supplement to describe the overall performance of a nondominated solution, which encourages the future trade-off research among those non-dominated solutions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the basic problem definition of a novel CBP portfolio framework is introduced. Section III presents the structural definition including value form, nodes and edges, and the capability value delivery model. Three types of capability generation patterns are introduced in this part from an SoS perspective. Section IV elaborates the multi-objective optimization process with a three-response level and feasibility modeling. Section V demonstrates the usefulness of the models by presenting the results of a 30 nodes' experiment. To make the final result convincible, a rule-based heuristic method for test data generation is proposed, and also, four SoS-level attributes are defined to present more information for the overall value of the non-dominated solutions. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and discusses possible future research.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
This paper focuses on a capability-based military SoS architecting problem that intends to bring systems together to meet the demand for multi-capability products. However, an SoS does not operate in isolation, and each system always provides multiple functions with distinct costs and performance levels. Interdependencies among systems make the SoS modeled as a network consists of nodes and edges. In essence, these interdependencies can exhibit force multiplier effects, measuring the benefits of increased collaboration between military systems as they exchange resources such as data or information where systems that provide similar capabilities work in tandem to generate an improved overall performing architecture. In addition to the benefits that can be achieved through collaboration, there are also negative consequences. For instance, individual systems/platforms may encounter information overloads under certain conditions. Additionally, there are costs incurred when maintaining increasingly complex network infrastructures that enable higher levels of collaboration [26] . Thus, a balance must be achieved. Figure 1 shows the scope of the network-based weapon systems portfolio selection problem. From the SoS perspective, the weapon architecture can be expressed as a graph G which consists of weapons W and interfaces I among them, and a meta-architecture is a subgraph of G. In order to obtain an efficient structure, we need to evaluate the value of meta-architectures under certain scenarios. As shown in (1), the value can be modeled from two aspects. From a static view, the value of a network G under scenarios is V (S, G) which can be considered the feasibility of capabilities C and performances P in three response levels, and how the C and P can be generated from a network is the focus of this paper. From a dynamic view, the weapon networks are designed to accomplish operational missions. Thus, mission scheduling theory, kill chain theory, simulation method, and so forth can be applied for the formulation of the mission effectiveness of G which will be studied in future research. Then, the basic formulation can be described as follows:
Considering other objectives including cost, risk, and other structural metrics, such problems can be modeled as constrained nonlinear optimization problems, which are known to be NP-hard. The complexity of such a problem depends on the complex relations among the weapons. Consequently, we argue that the analytical solution to the problem is not feasible and the heuristic-based optimization algorithm is effective. In this article, we use Non-Dominated Sortingbased Genetic Algorithm-II (NSGA-II) for our optimization tasks.
III. SINGLE SCENARIO FORMULATION
A typical capability planning problem always starts with the identification of future scenarios which define what capabilities are desirable in the future planning horizon. These scenarios can be divided into several stages. Each stage involves multiple scenarios which will evolve over time. A scenario is a set of systems with capabilities, consisting of the existing systems and future systems. A typical scenario in defense may refer to a targeted operation in a specific physical terrain, threat environment, and a predicted enemy strength [2] . Such scenario specific capabilities-for example, unmanned ground or air vehicles-would vary in their effectiveness from another scenario. Hence, we assume that a capability in every scenario performs differently on effectiveness scores. In other words, each capability should have a set of effectiveness scores corresponding to the number of scenarios.
A. SCENARIOS AND VALUE DEFINITION
We employ two measurements mentioned in [3] to define the scenario. Measures of Effectiveness: Qualitative measures that describe how well the system meets its intended purpose. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are provided by the acquirer or user of the system to define the operational effectiveness of the solution. Measures of Performance: Quantitative measures that represent how well the system meets the required functionality. Measures of performance (MOPs) characterizes the physical and functional attributes relevant to system operation.
A scenario is defined by the set of systems with effectiveness scores and performance scores for all capabilities in the wish list. A scenario can be represented as a two-tuple, which contains the effectiveness set and the performance set, as shown below:
C is the effectiveness matrix for all the systems, the effectiveness scores have various meanings according to the intended purpose. When it is used to represent a reconnaissance capability, it can be defined as the probability of detecting targets.
When it represents a kind of strike ability, it is defined as the probability of destroying the target. Its measurement is related closely to the complete effect of the assigned task, and will change with the change of the operational environment or the enemy's combat force and will be influenced by the interrelations among systems. P is the performance matrix of all the systems. Relative to the effectiveness index, the performance index is a fixed value for the functional description of the system, and will not be affected by intersystem collaboration. We use these two matrices to describe the satisfaction of a particular structure to specific requirements, which are expressed as follows:
where m is the number of systems to trade off, n is the number of capabilities in the wish list, and h is the number of the performance index in the wish list. Note that c ij denotes the effectiveness score of the j-th capability provided by the i-th system, and so as to p ij . All the values are normalized to be between 0 and 1. If the value is set to be 0, it indicates that the system is not able to provide such capabilities.
B. SYSTEMS NETWORK MODELING
In the information battlefield, the relationship between systems is closely interrelated. They cooperate with each other to complete the combat mission via varieties of material, energy, and information flows, connecting all kinds of systems to form a combat network. The basic structure and attributes of a meta-architecture are shown in Figure 2 , indicating that three different type of weapons with different attributes interoperate to provide capabilities. We assume that interaction behavior between systems will have a positive or negative impact on the performance of the system, and further lead to the change of overall capability level. The system is regarded as the node of the network, and the cooperative relationship is regarded as the edge. Some symmetry measures of the network theory will be applied to the calculation of the value. In this paper, all the nodes and edges are homogenous, categorized by a unified classification, and are distinguished only according to the ability they provide. VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. The basic structure and attributes of a meta-architecture.
1) META-FUNCTIONAL NODE MODELING
A functional node can be represented as a tuple, which contains type, operational cost, survival rate, and resilience, as shown below:
T stands for the weapon type. According to the actual needs in combat, the weapons are classified into three categories. OC indicates the operational cost instead of the purchase cost, which is a comprehensive way to address the consideration to deploy a system which may include all the cost spent on the weapon. S stands for the survivability of a system which is a probability that the system can survive in combat. R is the resilience ability of a system and refers to the ability of the system to recover after losing its combat capability. As shown in Table 1 , the systems are basically clarified into three types which vary in four attributes. Type 1 represents a kind of system with low efficiency, low cost, high survival rate, and low resilience. It is usually an old weapon which is still the main component of the military's existing weapon architecture. This kind of weapon is currently mainly used to perform some general patrol tasks or small-scale conflicts with low response levels. From an SoS perspective, its performance and collaboration with other newly developed systems should still be considered in future capacity-based planning. Representative systems include old aircraft, patrol ships, decommissioning destroyers, and so forth. For type 2, the system is with medium efficiency, low cost, low survival rate, and high resilience. The swarm tactics and distributed killing are currently very hot operational concepts. They use low-cost, high-performance combat units to complete combat missions. Although they have low survivability, they have strong substitution and resilience, which can significantly improve combat efficiency. Like low-cost drones which are suitable for small and medium-sized battles. Low-cost and rapid deployment features can reduce survival considerations. Type 3 represents a system with high efficiency, high cost, high survival rate, and medium resilience which benefits from comprehensive protection support, such as an aircraft carrier. Through the reasonable deployment ratio of the three types of systems, it can meet the needs of many different levels of operational requirements in the future. If we follow the traditional method to pursue the maximization of performance and minimization of costs, it will lead to a single, unbalanced, and low practical applicability of the designed equipment structure.
2) INTERFACES MODELING
Collaboration can be defined as ''a process in which individuals work together to achieve a common goal. Shared information is an essential ingredient to ensure effective collaboration'' [26] . The collaboration between systems is usually accomplished through the exchange of information, resources, and materials, whose essence is an information network, and the information network has some unique metrics which will also affect the generation of the system capability. Each system has a pre-defined collaboration relationship or interface set to describe which systems it can communicate with. Therefore, we do not consider coding the cooperation relationships as decision variables in the system portfolio selection. As long as a system is selected, all the cooperation relations are also established. It is different from the approach proposed in [9] and [32] . They choose to code all the possible interfaces into decision variables, which will lead to a huge solution space and cost too much computing resources when conducting optimization. With this strategy, our algorithm can be applied to the optimization of network structures with more nodes.
From the perspective of information network features, we adopt the idea in [26] which define an interface with two metrics of failure rate and interoperability level. And a functional edge can be defined as:
I A is a symbol used to indicate whether this edge exists, FR is short for failure rate, and IOL is short for interoperability level. Based on the approach proposed in [26] , a statistical reliability model is developed to model the impact of collaboration. The collaboration between a pair of systems has the probability of failure which will, in turn, affect the performance of overall capability. Interoperability is an indicator to describe the level of information exchange between systems. If the information network's traffic exceeds the load or the structure is too complicated, it will cause delays in the transmission of information, congestion in the channel, and even structural flaws, and finally, limit the overall capability. To describe the interface attributes between each pair of systems, I is defined as a three-dimensional matrix as (6) , as shown at the bottom of the next page, where m is the number of systems and 3 is the attribute dimension of the interface. I ij A has the value of 0 and 1, and it represents whether there is an interface between system i and system j or not. If I A equals to 0, it means that these two systems have no resource exchange. However, it does not mean that they cannot collaborate. Sometimes, several systems are designed to perform the same capability, even if there are no interfaces between them, they can still achieve the improvement of capability through this kind of collaboration. Additionally, the detailed function to describe the improvement will be illustrated in the following section. I A equals to 0 will also lead to the 0 value result of I A × FR and I A × IOL which means that the failure rate and interoperability level of the interface will not be considered.
The value of failure rate is between 0 and 1. The degree to which two military systems interoperate to exchange information and services is often expressed as an interoperability level or IOL. Various scales for defining IOL s exist. We adopt the IOL definition from [26] . Typically, the minimum value on an IOL scale indicates little or no resource exchange. As the IOL increases in value, additional resources will be exchanged for mission support.
C. CAPABILITY DELIVERY MODEL
An essential subject in CBP is that how the capability is delivered in a force structure. Perry notes that ''traditional measures of effectiveness usually ignore the effects of information and decision making on combat outcomes'' [27] . To capture any potential differences in effectiveness that arises due to collaboration and structural influence of a network. Symmetry measures on complex network with the ideas from [24] and [26] are employed to describe several considerations of capability enhancement from both local and global perspective. We take the structural influence formula in [26] as the fundamental calculation framework and replace the input capability value with an integrated value according to the interface influence model in [24] and the capability collaboration model proposed in this paper. And then, a threestep calculation model is proposed to give a comprehensive explanation of capability delivery pattern in a network. Figure 3 shows a simple illustration of a capability delivery model. W stands for the system, C stands for capability, and the blue box stands for a set of systems that provide the same capability. The dotted line indicates the exit of the node and the edge (caused by the exit of the node), and the red line indicates the degree of the node.
1) VALUE IMPROVED THROUGH INTERFACES DIRECTLY
Focusing on a single system, we assume that additional capability can be gained through the interfaces between systems. The more interfaces the system has, the more information or other kinds of resources can be delivered to help the system gain stronger battlefield awareness and better support. In network theory, the number of interfaces owned by a system can be expressed as the degree of a node. When the meta-architecture changes, the exit and join of some nodes will lead to the increase or decrease of edges, which will affect the number of interfaces of each system. Pape et al. [24] assume that the number of interfaces will lead to small exponential growth in performance. The value of depends on the context. To ensure that he number of interfaces improves the performance within a reasonable range, this paper give the value of by adjusting it in a range and comparing the calculation outcomes with the result of a multi-agent simulation system developed by our laboratory. We adopt the formula in [24] directly to describe the local improvement through interfaces with neighbor nodes, which works for each value in the MoE matrix:
where c * ij is the updated value of c ij which stands for the j-th capability value provided by the i-th system. is a constant used to describe the degree of capacity enhancement. degree i is the degree of the i-th system in a certain meta-architecture. As shown in Figure 3 , the degree of W2 is 2.
2) VALUE IMPROVED BY PROVIDING THE SAME CAPABILITY Although Pape et al. [24] give the formulation that system' performance will be improved by interfaces directly, the author show little concern on the aggregation of capability when several systems are providing the same capability. As mentioned in Section IIIA, capability is used to measure the effectiveness or probability to accomplish the assigned mission. It is assumed that the simultaneous use of multiple
systems with this capability will increase the probability of accomplishing the task. Taking the detection capability as an example, multiple platforms are assigned to conduct a wide area search mission in a fixed region. To simplify the analysis, we assumed that locating an enemy through a platform is independent of locating an enemy from another platform. As a consequence, the improved capability resulting from this kind of collaboration can be modeled as follows:
where C i is the i-th capability in the planning list. c * ij is the outcome of (7). x j is the indicator of the j-th system which holds the value 0 or 1. When it equals to 1, it means that the j-th system is selected in the meta-architecture. Otherwise, it is not. The value of x j can be determined by the chromosome representation of a meta-architecture in the following optimization section. When c * ij or x j is 0, it does not affect the final calculation result. So that C i is aggregated under two conditions. One is that system j must be selected in the meta-architecture. The other is that system j must provide this capability.
3) VALUE INFLUENCED BY THE STRUCTURE
In the above section, we have analyzed and modeled the impact of collaboration on the capability enhancement from a local perspective. However, this is not comprehensive. It only describes the impact caused by neighbor nodes. For other indirect nodes and the impact from the entire architecture, it has not been analyzed. The systems form a whole system of systems through interconnection and interoperation, and the architecture can have a positive and negative impact on capabilities. If the capability is viewed as the probability or the certainty of completing the task, the positive impact brought by the architecture can be used to excavate the remaining uncertainties, and the negative influence will limit the overall performance. We use the formula in the [26] to model the information network effects. However, we replace the original input with the value we obtain from (8) to address the concerns of local improvement. The formula is as follows:
where α is the coefficient to describe how much uncertainties can be exploited by successful collaboration across the whole network structure which is also a reflection of indirect collaboration effectiveness. β is a network complexity parameter used to describe the negative impact caused by information overload.
D. THE NETWORK INFLUENCE
Though collaboration provides benefits of information superiority in the battlefield, there are also negative consequences. When maintaining increasingly complex network infrastructures that enable higher levels of collaboration, additional costs and information overload may occur [26] . Thus, a balance must be achieved. The next step is to give a detailed method to calculate the two structural parameters, α and β. Based on the approach proposed in [26] and [27] , we divide the impact of network structure, especially resource exchange network, into two aspects. One is the amount of resource exchange between a pair of systems, and the other is the probability of successful exchange.
1) SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION
The model of reliability and theory of information entropy are used in the [26] to model the dynamic uncertainty of operational effects with changes in environment and conditions, and the effectiveness of the collaboration is seen as the elimination of uncertainty. By defining the successful collaboration rate between each pair of systems and calculating the difference of entropy to obtain the degree of elimination of the uncertainty between each pair of systems, an entropy elimination matrix is obtained. The normalized maximum eigenvalue is used as the structural parameter of the cooperative success rate in [26] . However, to simplify the analysis, we use directly the probability of collaboration success which is essentially an expression of uncertainty as an element in the matrix to approximate the structural influence parameter. After this, a total system collaboration factor is determined that accounts for all pairs of collaborating systems.
where FR S i is a failure rate matrix of solution i which represents a certain meta-architecture, and λ max is the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix. Normalization is performed by dividing by (k − 1) nodes.
2) LIMITATION CAUSED BY COMPLEXITY
Considering the negative consequences caused by the complexity of the network, the more complex structure and the greater burden of resource exchange will make the network less effective. Perry et al. [27] acknowledge that ''the number of connections in a network clearly cannot assess the complexity of network-centric operations.'' The indicator of IOL is employed instead to describe the amount of resources exchange among each pair of systems and utilize this information to define a resource processing matrix. Similarly, by calculating matrix eigenvalues, a global complexity coefficient that affects all system capabilities can be obtained.
Reference [26] also details how the specific nature of each resource that is being exchanged across a network influences complexity. We use the formula in [26] to calculate the negative effects as below:
IOL S i is an interoperability level matrix of solution i. λ max is the maximum eigenvalue. IOL max is the maximum rating of IOL.
(1 − 1/ √ k)/k is a correction factor considering the scale of the network structure. Without this factor, the same connection density for small and large networks will yield the same result which is apparently not practical. The final equation, taking into account both global collaboration effects and complexity effects, is shown in (9).
IV. MULTI-OBJECTIVE PROGRAMMING
Through the definition of the scenario and capability delivery model in Section III, a multi-objective optimization problem is defined to design a military SoS in a specific scenario. However, according to the combat needs and characteristics of an actual force structure, the weapon SoS is always a mixture of new and old weapons, and low-performance weapons have advantages in some specific scenarios. Therefore, instead of simply maximizing the capability or effectiveness, which is used as the objective in [22] - [25] , we propose a three-level response model and a feasibility assessment model to address the concern. Different response levels call for different weapon configurations according to varying objective functions. We assumed that a good weapon architecture is not defined by better performance but by better feasibility, and the final force structure should be a superposition of structures under three response levels.
A. RESPONSE LEVEL MODELING
Combat response level is a concept widely used in the military field for better preparation for warfare. It can deal with the deployment of high-efficient solutions for emergency of different scales. The combat response level is divided into three levels in our study, and the feasibility is chosen as the measurement to define the value of a portfolio at each level. Feasibility is a conversion of MoEs and MoPs indicating what level of capability is most appropriate in certain scenarios. To capture the nonlinear relation features, Xiong et al. [33] employed a right-skewed beta distribution to describe the relationship between activity duration and time, and a logistic function for resource efficiency and accumulated time in a satellite mission scheduling problem, which is practical in real-world projects. As a similar consideration, we use two different type of curves by changing the parameters of the beta functions as shown in Figure 4 (a) and (b) and the logistic function in Figure 4 (c) to describe the mapping relationship between capability value and feasibility under different response levels. Taking the right-skewed beta function as an example, the feasibility value increases slowly at the beginning, however, when capability value is close to the most appropriate point, the growth speed is significantly accelerated, which is in line with the practical situation. For the logistic function, the feasibility of the capability value is converted into an S-shaped curve, and the growth speed of feasibility will increase at the beginning and then decrease as the capability value increases.
For response level 1, it usually represents the situation of routine patrol or guard mission and small-scale military conflicts which do not need the deployment of high-performance weapons. In most cases, a small-scale reconnaissance capability or a low-level fire deterrence capability is enough for mission needs. Therefore, some low-efficient but also low-cost systems, or low-efficient with high survivability systems, or old systems are usually assigned to accomplish this level of task response. We assume that, in this case, a capability value of 0.5 is most appropriate, and extra capability will cause waste. Therefore, the feasibility function of response level 1 can be represented in Figure 4 (a).
For response level 2, the threat of the mission obviously rises. The enemy invests more troops and has a stronger purpose which calls for a more effective response. Under the premise of restricting the cost of dispatch, the effectiveness of combat operations should be improved to a relatively high level, and the purpose of Anti-Access or Area Denial should be achieved. In this case, the low-cost and high-efficiency features of the unmanned systems show strong suitability. Therefore, we assume that a capability value of 0.75 is most appropriate, and the feasibility function shape shows the right-skewed feature.
For response level 3, the operational cost is no more considered a factor for force design. As the scale of warfare increases, it requires that the strongest combat forces be deployed to defeat the enemy. The logistic function is employed to describe the requirements for capability maximization.
The feasibility function under three levels is modeled as follows:
The feasibility function is effective for all capability and performance index. As both of MoEs and MoPs are normalized to dimensionless 0 to 1 values, we define the final value of a portfolio as the total sum of the feasibility of each capability and performance index as below:
We choose operational cost or deployment cost instead of the purchasing cost as the other objective rather than a constraint because when considering the construction of future combat forces, the achievement of combat capability is still the first priority. We can consider minimizing the cost under the premise of achieving the expected capability. If the cost is regarded as a constraint, the solution space may be limited, and the optimal solution may be missed. Also, the purchasing cost is not suitable as a basis for operational deployment concerns. The deployment of the weapon systems will involve additional costs of various supporting forces and resources. Thus, it is more appropriate to consider the deployment cost instead. We use a quadratic function to convert the deployment cost into a cost efficiency coefficient of 0-1 as shown in Figure 4 (d), so as to reduce the efficiency difference of low-cost systems and increase the difference of high-cost weapons, which also increases the mutual substitutability among low-cost weapons.
In addition, when architecting the military SoS, other metrics like survivability and resilience should also be included. If we only pursue the maximization of capabilities, lowcost and high-efficiency systems like unmanned vehicles will inevitably become the focus of portfolio selection. However, its poor survivability will also cause the vulnerability of the designed structures. In this paper, we mainly introduce the capability delivery model and do not consider survivability and resilience as the optimization objectives. These metrics are only used to trade-off on the Pareto front as attributes of the meta-architectures. In future research, many objectives optimization can be studied to include more SoS measurements as optimization goals.
B. CONSTRAINTS
In the process of military SoS architecting, we need to consider the following constraints.
1) COMPLETENESS
As MoEs and MoPs are the value forms defined in the capability wish list for future scenarios, different weapons have different performance levels in some capabilities. To satisfy the capabilities requirements and do not cause redundancy, portfolio selection needs to be conducted on the weapon set. However, as the number of weapons increases, the number of possible combinations will grow exponentially and some of the solutions will cause capability vacancies. That is, some MoEs and MoPs will have no weapons to support, and the value will be 0. These kinds of solutions are not reasonable, so the constraints to guarantee the completeness of a portfolio are defined as below.
In addition, the purpose of the CBP is to construct an interoperable SoS structure. We assume that all the weapons that are intended for selection need to be incorporated into the SoS and interoperate as a whole to provide capabilities. Working independently is not allowed. If we regard the weapon system of systems as a network graph, its connectivity needs to be guaranteed. The structure of separated graphs is unreasonable. Algebraic connectivity [28] , as an important indicator of the connectivity of the graph, is adopted to measure the connectivity of the combat system of systems as follows:
The algebraic connectivity (also known as Fiedler value or Fiedler eigenvalue) of a graph G is the second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of G where D is the degree matrix, and A is the adjacency matrix of the graph. This eigenvalue is greater than 0 if and only if G is a connected graph. The magnitude of this value reflects how well connected the overall graph is. It has been used in analyzing the robustness and synchronizing the ability of networks. In this article, we only use it to ensure the connectivity of the architecture we build and the magnitude of its value will not be considered.
C. ENCODING
In order to solve the portfolio selection problem with a multiobjective optimization algorithm, we encode decision variables into chromosomes. Since each solution represents a network structure, the corresponding matrix will also change. The structural parameters mentioned in the previous sections must be recalculated. Using a binary notation, our decision variable can be defined as.
x i ∈ X = 1, if system i is selected to be programmed 0, otherwise (19) As the meta-architecture changes, the related changed matrix includes the capability value matrix, performance value matrix, connection matrix, failure rate matrix, IOL matrix, and, further, the degree list of each system.
D. ALGORITHM STEPS
According to the capability delivery model in Section III and the response level model in Section IV, we can build a multiobjective optimization model. In order to get a better understanding of the proposed model, all the parameters and the final multi-objective optimization problem (MOOP) formula are summarized as below:
As Section III gives a detailed definition of the capability delivery model to explain how MoEs are affected by collaboration, we will supplement the MoP's calculation method in this part to make the final formula complete. Because MoP is a fixed value for the functional description of the system and will not be affected by inter-system collaboration as defined in Section III, the calculation method is not as complex as MoE. p ij stands for the i-th MoP value provided by system j in the MoP matrix. P i is the integrated value of several systems who provide this function. x j is the indicator for the system j in a solution to indicate whether system j is selected to be programmed in this portfolio or not. We assume that the final value of MoP is the maximum of all systems with this metric and the integration formula is defined as below:
To maximize the feasibility of MoEs and MoPs and minimize the cost efficiency of the force structure under certain constraints, conflicts often exist among these objectives. That is to say, it is not possible to make all sub-objective functions achieve optimization at the same time, instead, we can only obtain the compromise solution of these optimization objectives, which is the Pareto optimality problem proposed by Rao [34] . None of the solutions in the Pareto optimal set or non-dominated set are better than other solutions, thus, the key to solving the MOOP problem lies in how to find the Pareto optimal set. As the feasibility function varies with the response level, we take the function in response level 3 as an example. The expansion of the equation is based on the model formulae in Sections III and IV. All capability delivery considerations are explained in the final formulation.
NSGA-II is a popular multi-objective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA) which uses non-dominated sorting and shared variable methods to maintain the diversity of Pareto frontiers effectively, and it has been proven to be effective in solving two objective problems [23] , [35] . Two other algorithms of eNSGA-II and eMOEA will also be employed as comparisons. eMOEA is a steady-state MOEA that uses e-dominance archiving to record a diverse set of Pareto optimal solutions [36] . eNSGA-II combines the generational search of NSGA-II with the guaranteed convergence provided by an e-dominance archive [37] . The implementation was based on the MOEA Framework (http://moeaframework.org/), which is a free and open source Java library for developing and experimenting with MOEAs. Incorporating this with the capability value delivery model, the algorithm steps designed in this paper are as follows.
Step 1: Define the parameters of the algorithm including population size, iterations, and the crossover probability parameter. VOLUME 6, 2018 Objectives:
the maximum vlaue of supported weapons
Improvementby providing the same capability
Complexity factor
Subject to:
Step 2: Initialize the population. The initial population is randomly generated, and the individual encoding structure is mentioned in Section IV C.
Step 3: Sort the population. Each individual stands for a specific network structure. By calculating the parameters of the network structure and the objective functions above, the individuals will be evaluated and a non-dominated sorting to the initial population will be made to get the Pareto solution set. Then individuals are given ranks and crowding distance values, and the binary tournament selection operation will be implemented.
Step 4: Mutation and crossover. The mutation operator is used to mutate the population, and the offspring population Q is generated by crossover operations on each individual with a certain probability.
Step 5: Evaluate the temporary population. Non-dominated sorting and crowd distance sorting will be conducted on the temporary population which is composed of the present population P and the offspring population Q.
Step 6: Generate a new population. Select the best half individuals from the temporary population to generate a new population.
Step 7: Evolution and iteration. The termination condition is then checked to see whether the algorithm should stop, if yes, the current population is the result and if no, new populations will be generated to start a new iteration from step 3.
In Table 3 , we initialize the size of the candidate solutions to 300 and set the maximum generation to 2000. In the crossover operator, the crossover probability is set to be 0.2. The probability of the bit flip mutation is 0.05. Since the objective function is a complex calculation process based on network structure parameters, the detailed calculation flow integrated with the NSGA-II is listed in the following pseudo-code.
E. STRUCTURAL MERGE
To get a more adaptive solution that can cover the requirements in different response levels, the final force structure
Algorithm 1 The Pseudo-Code for the Proposed Algorithm
Input: Initial population members, P of size N ; the maximum number of generations, maxGen; the crossover probability, pc; the mutation probability, pm Output: P, BestF 1 BestF← Ø; 2 l = 1; 3 P ← Generatepopulation(N ) should be the fusion of non-dominated solutions of three levels. However, there are many non-dominated solutions in each level, the possible combination of the three levels is huge, and the repeatability of the nodes will lead to the similarity of the combined results. How to evaluate the solutions is also worth studying. In this paper, the capability generation mechanism is mainly studied. Due to the limitation of the article length, no further analyses are made on the structure fusion.
Merge(nondominated(level1), nondominated(level2), nondominated(level3)) (23)

V. ILLUSTRATION A. INITIAL DATA GENERATION METHOD
In order to verify the validity of the proposed model, a large number of data instances are needed because the CBP and SoS architecting are important works of the country which possess a long life cycle feature. Such case data are scarce and difficult to obtain in reality. So, according to the characteristics of a real planning mission, we put forward a rulebased heuristic method for test data generation to simulate the actual data features. The data includes the weapon attributes data, weapon capability data, collaboration interfaces, and attributes. First, we define the number of weapons, the number of MoEs, and the number of MoPs. A total of 1-3 values are generated randomly for each weapon, which represents the weapon type. Additionally, the value range of other basic attributes is also defined according to the type. The operational cost is divided into 9 grades. Based on the weapon type above, type 1 corresponds to the value of an operational cost of 3-5 (randomly generated), a survival probability set between 0.7 and 0.9, and a resilience cost between 3 and 5. For type 2, referring to an unmanned equipment, the operational cost is set as 1-3, the survival probability is 0.3-0.6, and the resilience cost is 1-3. For type 3 such as an aircraft carrier, the operational cost is set to be 6-9, the survival probability is 0.7-0.9, and the resilience cost is 7-9.
Second, the value matrix is generated by traversing MoE and MoP to determine whether the support relationship is established by a certain probability, which is determined by the number of MoEs, MoPs, and weapons. If an association is confirmed, the capability value is set according to the type of weapon. A collection of n MoEs and h MoPs is provided in various degrees by the constitute systems, where zeros represent no contribution of that metric by that weapon. For different weapon types, the value is set to be 0.3-0.5, 0.5-0.7, and 0.6-0.9, respectively.
Finally, the interface matrix will be generated. Because the undirected relation is considered, the matrix will be symmetric. By traversing the upper trigonometry of the matrix, a probability of 0.2 is used to determine whether a VOLUME 6, 2018 collaborative relationship is established or not, which also reflects an average level of weapon collaboration capability in reality. Subsequently, a successful collaboration probability of 0-1, and IOL of 1-5 are randomly generated for the interface.
So far, an initial data set that can basically reflect the characteristics of weapon structure and capability has been generated.
B. INPUTS
According to the rule-based heuristic for initial data generation proposed in the Section V A, the basic attributes of systems, the interrelations between systems with attributes of the edges, and the capability and performance level of each system are established.
As shown in Table 4 , 30 systems with different types, operational costs, survival rates, and resilience costs are listed. Taking weapon 15 as an example, the survival rate is high, however, the operational cost and resilience cost are also high. Weapon 0 is the opposite. They can all address the characteristics of actual weapons.
Interfaces among 30 systems, 30 MoEs, and 10 MoPs are listed in Tables 5 and 6 . Some of them just have one capability, whereas some can support multiple capabilities. For single capability, there are usually several systems to provide in different levels. Table 7 shows the collaborative relationships among the weapons; 35 relationships are established with a collaboration failure rate and interoperability level from an information network perspective.
C. SoS ATTRIBUTES
Because non-dominated solutions on the Pareto front obtained by optimization have a non-dominant relationship between deployment cost and feasibility, and the differences in weapon structures vary a lot. How to further choose from these non-dominated solutions is the focus of the future research. Each solution represents an SoS architecture that contains a set of interoperable systems. In many previous studies on the military SoS [10] , [29] - [32] , a number of SoS attributes that measure different aspects of the architecture have been proposed, including flexibility [32] , robustness [30] - [32] , resilience [29] , and so forth. By calculating these parameters, they can be used as a basis for further trade-off.
1) FLEXIBILITY
Different from [32] , flexibility is defined in this paper as the substitutability of weapons within the same capability. For one capability, the more weapons that can provide this capability, the more flexible the alternatives can be in the event of an emergency. Failure of one or more pieces of weapons does not result in the failure of that ability. In realistic combat, flexibility is especially important. There are essential differences between the reduction of capabilities and the inability of capabilities. The inability of capabilities may cause cascading effects, leading to the paralysis of overall combat capabilities. Therefore, whether or not there is good flexibility is an important indicator of a good or bad structure. In this paper, the flexibility of the system is defined as an average level of weapon quantity under all capabilities. We employ two indicators of the mean and variance of the amount of equipment under the capabilities to measure the overall flexibility of a portfolio.
2) SURVIVABILITY Survivability is one of the basic attributes of the weapons. It is a statistical value to describe the survival probability of the weapon in the combat context. The definition of the system's survivability in this paper is a weighted sum of the survival probabilities of all weapons. The weight is determined by the importance of weapon. We assume that the more important weapons in the architecture have a greater impact on the overall survivability of the SoS. To calculate the importance of a weapon in an SoS, we adopt the concept of betweenness as the measurement to estimate the centrality of a node in a network [38] . The more paths a weapon possesses, the more important the weapon is. The concept of the path is also consistent with the OODA theory [22] , [23] in actual combat operations, so the betweenness is reasonable to describe the importance of a weapon in a network-based SoS structure.
Node Importance sr i (25) 3) RESILIENCE
Resilience is another of the basic attributes of the weapon. It is a metric used to describe the ability of a piece of equipment VOLUME 6, 2018 to recover its original level after being destroyed or incapacitated. There are many models for resilience [29] , and a simplified resilience calculation model is used in this article to measure the resilience of weapons. For each weapon, we multiply the resilience by the probability that the weapon was destroyed in combat, then we sum all the weapons up as a final resilience measurement of a portfolio.
4) ROBUSTNESS
Robustness is one of a series of difficult to define attributes of SoS. Generally, it is the ability to deliver capability in unknown future conditions [30] . An ideal SoS architecture should avoid single point failures. When a suitable SoS performance model exists, the architect can assess the SoS capability measures of the performance changes when each individual system is removed [31] . Three indicators are employed here as a description for the robustness of an architecture, which includes the maximum value of differences in capability performance when one system is removed, the minimum value, and the D-value.
To illustrate the effectiveness of the capability delivery model and simplify the experiment to a clear level within a limited article length, this paper only selects one case for multiobjective optimization. That is, to maximize the feasibility of the response level 3 situation and minimize the cost efficiency. Additionally, all the results are analyzed in the following section based on this situation. Future research will be conducted on all response levels and structure fusions. Figure 5 gives the Pareto fronts calculated by NSGA-II, eNSGA-II, and eMOEA. Each algorithm is executed for 25 independent runs. We make a statistical analysis of the results, shown in Table 8 . The optimal value, the worst value, the mean value, and the variance are tabulated. The optimal and worst value can illustrate the merits of the solutions. The average value can reflect the overall quality of the algorithm. The variance is the overall stability of the algorithm.
It can be seen that all indexes of eNSGA-II are better than those of NSGA-II and eMOEA, which indicates that most of the solutions are concentrated at a good level. The results of NSGA-II have a wider diversity relative to eNSGA-II. However, they are also more decentralized. For eMOEA, the results are biased towards the optimization of the objective of cost efficiency which results in a generally lower score of the overall feasibility of solutions. In summary, it can be concluded that eNSGA II has higher adaptability for this model. Figure 6 (a) and (b) show an original fully structured weapon architecture and an optimized non-dominated structure of solution 0. Orange nodes represent the weapons, purple nodes stand for MoEs, and green nodes stand for MoPs. Red nodes are intended to be removed in solution 0. We can see from the Figure 6 and Table 9 , with the removal of [0, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23] and the associated edges, the overall feasibility of capability reaches 0.89875, which is better than the full set structure. This resulted from the considerations of weapon collaborations and structural complexity impact. As the number of weapons grows, the negative effect of resource overload has exceeded the collaboration improvement on feasibility value, which is more in line with the practical situation. The feasibility of performance is the same as the full set structure, but with a lower cost and complexity. According to the MoP calculation function, this means that the necessary weapons that provide the maximum MoP value have already been programmed in the solution. That is to say, the optimized solution which has fewer nodes becomes more efficient in all aspects. Not just constrained by cost, but considering the practical network-centric warfare characteristics, the optimized structure has a better performance relative to the full set solution. The network-based capability delivery model and the feasibility model proposed in this paper provide decision makers (DMs) with structural considerations in the CBP process. Table 10 shows the calculated importance of a certain solution. The degree and importance of each node will be used as coefficients in capability, survivability, and resilience calculation. We can see that not all the nodes with high degrees have high importance. This is a consequence of taking betweenness as a measurement of importance which has more practical meaning. VOLUME 6, 2018 In order to illustrate the rationality of the model, we chose 4 non-dominated solutions to compare their structure and performance as shown in Table 11 .
E. RESULT ANALYSIS
As the feasibility function for response level 3 is a sigmoid function, we can see from Table 11 that the feasibility value rises obviously from S1 to S18 with 4 more weapons.
However, it rises slower when compared to S15 and S0. The solution of S1 with 12 nodes is non-dominated because of its efficient structure. However, the feasibility value is relatively low, which will be less considered in the final decision making. For S15 and S18, we can see that S18 has fewer nodes but a high complexity which may cause negative consequences. By analyzing the input data, we found that weapon W20 exchange recourses with three other weapons in IOL 5, which creates a bigger complexity factor. This illustrates the practical meaning of the resource exchange consideration, and this kind of weapon which has a great structural influence needs to be carefully considered by DMs when designing the architecture.
The influence on the network construction caused by the proposed model is more obvious in response level 2. As shown in Table 12 , the solutions are totally different from the solutions in response level 3. The feasibility function transforms the objective of maximizing the overall feasibility of making the capability value closer to 0.7. As a consequence, the solution of S * 11 with 11 nodes [1] , [4] , [8] , [9] , [14] , [17] , [18] , [24] , [25] , [27] , [29] has the highest feasibility value of 0.8, whereas the full set structure only gets 0.239427 in this situation. In particularly, weapon 4, 17, and 18 of type1 with low-performance values are also programmed in this solution, which demonstrates that the deployment of weapons should be a comprehensive consideration of the overall set and response level rather than single system performance. Additionally, for S * 11 and S * 12, although they have the same number of nodes, weapon 1 and weapon 25 are more effective in structural collaboration and capability provision, with less cost than weapon 16 and weapon 21. In S * 12, the high-cost weapon is deployed, however, the feasibility value decrease, which should be avoided in military planning. Figure 7 gives the weapon selections of each nondominated solution. A black mark means the weapon is contained in the portfolio. From the figure, we can see that some weapons are frequently chosen, such as weapon 5, 10, 25, and 26, however, some weapons such as weapon 13 and 14 are never selected. By analyzing the input data, we can find that weapon 5, 10, 25 and 26 can provide various capabilities including some specific ones. Although weapons 5 and 10 are just type 1 weapons as shown in Table 4 , they are still necessary for military SoS architecting. And from a structural perspective as shown in Table 10 , weapons 5 and 10 either have high importance or have large degree indicating a great structural impact in a network. DMs should not neglect this kind of weapons in military planning. For weapon 13 and 14, they are redundant for the capabilities provided. Figure 8 presents some of the final results of each portfolio including the overall capability, cost efficiency, and robustness. Most of the portfolios have a relatively high-level performance, however, the cost varies a lot, which means that some of the structures exchange a little performance improvement with high additional cost; this is not reasonable and will be studied in future research. The figure of robustness shows that nearly half of the portfolios have a good robust performance at a relatively high level. This will also lead to further research on the refinement of non-dominated solution sets.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
System of systems (SoS) architecting finds many practical applications in defense and military fields. The systems' capabilities and the cumulative capabilities achieved from their interoperability are fundamental for CBP and are crucial for gaining a competitive advantage in the battleground. This study uses network-based theory and its symmetry measures to formulate and propose efficient solution methods for an SoS architecting problem with different system types. In particular, a two-objective portfolio optimization model is presented with certain intelligent optimization algorithms to approximate the Pareto front. The concept of centrality, betweenness, degree, network collaboration, and information overload, which will cause positive and negative consequences for capability generation, are employed as the basis for capability approximation. Based on these, three capability delivery models and three response level feasibility models from different perspectives are proposed to calculate the objectives. Additionally, the four SoS-level attributes of flexibility, survivability, resilience, and robustness are also defined and calculated as supplements to make the value of the solution architecture more comprehensive.
We demonstrate the application of the model presented with a simple scenario. This scenario shows the benefits of considering the network influence. In particular, as expected, without using cost or risk as constraints to limit the number of systems, an efficient network structure with fewer nodes performs better than a full set structure. This means that some of the systems are redundant for capability providing or they have structural negatives which will cause too much information exchange burden. Capability requirements can be satisfied by an efficient system set with the enhanced capabilities resulting from their collaboration. The experiment also shows the benefits of taking feasibility as objective instead of capability or performance. A purpose-oriented structure can be obtained, and some low-and medium-performance system can be considered in specific functional applications. Through a set of numerical studies, we compare the solution results and analyze the internal mechanism of capability generation. Several aspects are discussed. It is observed that some nodes have great structural influence and some are redundant for providing the capability. All these nodes need to be carefully considered by DMs. The experiments demonstrate that the deployment of weapons should be a comprehensive consideration of the overall SoS structure and response level rather than single system performance. Any small change in the network can cause a big difference in the final result. The model proposed in this paper provides a glimpse into how the capability is generated from an SoS in the context of networkcentric warfare and what should be considered by DMs when conducting SoS architecting.
This paper inspires the research on network-based weapon portfolio selection and SoS capability generation mechanism. Future research directions include allowing for multiple scenario optimizations with varying preferences, further trade-off among the non-dominated solutions according to the SoS attributes with multi-criteria decision-making methods, mission network modeling, and the dynamic evolving architecture issues. These challenges will certainly contribute to the expansion of this methodology for tackling a broader range of problems.
